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Abstract
In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic
collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters’ intensities of preference between
pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the
support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e.,
on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision.
Keywords: Triple-acyclicity; Majorities based on difference in support; Reciprocal preference relations;
Voting systems
1. Introduction
The aggregation of individual preferences under the simple majority rule could lead to a cyclical collective
preference. This fact was firstly pointed out by Condorcet [5] and known since then as the Condorcet’s
paradox. Recalling the classical example of this paradox, assume the following three voters’ preferences over
three alternatives x1, x2 and x3:
x1 1 x2 1 x3 x2 2 x3 2 x1 x3 3 x1 3 x2, (1)
where xi p xj
(
i, j, p ∈ {1, 2, 3}) means that individual p strictly prefers alternative xi to alternative xj
when both alternatives are in comparison. Guided by the preferences given in (1), individuals cast a vote for
their preferred alternative in pairwise contests. Aggregating these votes we obtain that alternatives x1, x2
and x3 defeat x2, x3 and x1, respectively, by two votes to one. Therefore, the collective preference relation
 is cyclical (and hence intransitive) given that x1  x2  x3  x1.
In the above example, individual preferences are misrepresented. Every voter declares if he/she prefers
an alternative to another one but nothing about the quantification of this preference. A wide variety of
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authors (see, for instance, Morales [27], Sen [30] or Nurmi [28]) have pointed out the importance for a
voting system (for getting a representative aggregation of individual preferences) of taking into account the
individuals’ intensities of preference among the alternatives in comparison. Reciprocal preference relations
formalize such idea. Through them, and by using values in the unit interval, every voter declares his/her
intensity of preference between the alternatives compared by pairs. Following this approach, we assume
that individuals’ preferences are given by reciprocal preference relations and that they fulfill some kind of
transitivity condition to avoid misleading preferences.
The introduction of the intensities of preference promotes the extension of several aggregation rules to the
context of reciprocal preference relations. In the field of majority rules stand out the efforts done by Garc´ıa-
Lapresta and Llamazares to extend some of them through different operators that aggregate individual
reciprocal preferences (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [12], Llamazares and Garc´ıa-Lapresta [24, 25],
and Llamazares [21, 23]). They have also introduced majorities based on difference in support or M˜k
majorities (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [14]). Under them, an alternative xi defeats another one xj
if the sum of the voters’ intensities of preference for xi exceeds the sum of the intensities of preferences for
xj in a given quantity, a threshold k, fixed before the election process. These rules extend majorities based
on difference of votes (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [13] and, for the axiomatic characterization,
Llamazares [22] and Houy [19]) from the context of ordinary individual preferences to that of intensities of
preference.
This paper is devoted to establish the thresholds k such that majorities based on difference in support
do not generate cycles of three alternatives on the collective preference. In the area of individual reciprocal
preferences, previous studies about the consistency of the collective decision have been done by Llamazares
et al. [26]. These authors have introduced conditions that ensure collective transitivity decisions under
majorities based on difference in support. Unfortunately, such conditions show that the support required
to the winner alternative turns really strong in order to guarantee transitive collective decisions. Here, we
relax the collective consistency condition to the weakest one, i.e., triple-acyclicity, with the aim of obtaining
reasonable requirements on the thresholds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to introduce the basic technical concepts we
deal with. Our main results are stated in sections 3 and 4. Specifically, in Section 3, we set the conditions
for triple-acyclic collective decisions under majorities based on difference in support when the rationality
of individual preferences is the weakest that it can be, whereas in Section 4 stronger individual rationality
conditions than that are taken into account. Finally, Section 5 is dedicated to compare the results obtained
here with those on transitive collective decisions under majorities based on difference in support stated in
Llamazares et al. [26].
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2. Preliminaries
This section is organized in three different parts: the first one deals with the types of preference relations
concerned, in particular, reciprocal preference relations and ordinary preference relations. The second one
is about the consistency conditions asked to these preference relations. Finally, the third one is dedicated
to explain the aggregation rule, i.e., majorities based on difference in support.
2.1. Preference relations
Consider a set of m voters, V = {1, . . . ,m}, who show their intensities of preferences on a set of
alternatives, X = {x1, . . . , xn}, through reciprocal preference relations Rp : X ×X −→ [0, 1], p = 1, . . . ,m;
i.e., rpij + r
p
ji = 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where rpij = Rp(xi, xj). In the context we consider, it is usual to
represent Rp by an n× n matrix which coefficients in the unit interval,
Rp =

rp11 r
p
12 . . . r
p
1n
rp21 r
p
22 . . . r
p
2n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
rpn1 r
p
n2 . . . r
p
nn
.
By reciprocity, all the main diagonal elements are 0.5 and rpji = 1− rpij if j > i. Therefore,
Rp =

0.5 rp12 . . . r
p
1n
1− rp12 0.5 . . . rp2n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1− rp1n 1− rp2n . . . 0.5
.
In this framework, voters can declare their preferences between alternatives, ordered by pairs, but also
the degree with which they prefer one alternative to other one through numbers in [0, 1]. Obviously, they also
could declare themselves indifferent between the alternatives. To be more concrete, given two alternatives
xi and xj , if voter p is indifferent between these two alternatives, then r
p
ij = 0.5. If he/she absolutely
prefers the alternative xi to the alternative xj , then r
p
ij = 1; on the contrary, if he/she absolutely prefers the
alternative xj to xi, then rij = 0. So far, the preferences described above can be viewed as a representation
of ordinary preferences.
Notice that an ordinary preference relation over X is an asymmetric binary relation on X: if xiPxj ,
then does not happen xjPxi. The indifference relation associated with P is defined as xiIxj and it means
that neither xi is preferred to xj nor xj is preferred to xi.
So, every ordinary preference relation P can be considered as a reciprocal preference relation R. Fur-
thermore, a reciprocal preference relation R is crisp if rpij ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}; so, we can
consider ordinary preferences and crisp preferences as equivalent for practical purposes.
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Coming back to reciprocal preference relations1, they allow voters to describe not so extreme preferences
as the absolute preference or the indifference stated above. Specifically, if a voter somewhat prefers alterna-
tive xi to xj , then 0.5 < r
p
ij < 1 and the closer is this number to 1, the more xi is preferred to xj . On the
contrary, if a voter somewhat prefers alternative xj to xi, then 0 < r
p
ij < 0.5 and the closer is this number
to 0, the more xj is preferred to xi.
Throughout the paper, R(X) denotes the set of reciprocal preference relations on X and P(X) denotes
the set of ordinary preference relations on X. A profile is a vector (R1, . . . , Rm) which contains the individual
preference relations on X. The set of profiles is denoted by R(X)m. Moreover, given a set A, #A will denote
the cardinality of A. Lastly, given a ∈ R, bac will denote the integer part of a; that is, the highest integer
lower than or equal to a.
2.2. Consistency on preference relations
In the context of ordinary preference relations, it is usual to relate consistency to transitivity condition,
but, as said before, in this paper we focus on a weaker consistency property than that, i.e., triple-acyclicity.
Triple-acyclicity is obtained by considering the acyclicity condition restricted to three alternatives. This
property has been widely studied in the framework of Social Choice theory, specifically in the area of
social choice functions (see, among others, Sen [31], Suzumura [32], Schwartz [29] and Cato and Hirata
[2]). It provides the minimum consistency requirement for social decisions, that is, to avoid cycles of three
alternatives. In the following definitions, we formally recall transitivity, acyclicity and triple-acyclicity
conditions.
Definition 1. An ordinary preference relation P ∈ P(X) is
1. transitive if for all xi, xj , xl ∈ X it holds that if xiPxj and xjPxl, then it also holds xiPxl.
2. acyclic if for all xi1 , . . . , xis ∈ X it holds that if xi1Pxi2 , . . . , xis−1Pxis , then it does not happen
xisPxi1 .
3. triple-acyclic if for all xi, xj , xl ∈ X it holds that if xiPxj and xjPxl, then it does not happen xlPxi.
Given that transitivity is a stronger condition than acyclicity and that one is a stronger requirement
than triple-acyclicity, if a preference relation is not triple-acyclic, it is also not acyclic and, consequently, not
transitive. Obviously, acyclicity and triple-acyclicity are equivalent when the social decision involves three
alternatives.
1Note that the property of reciprocity extends the properties of asymmetry (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Meneses [15]) and
completeness (see De Baets and De Meyer [7]) from the framework of ordinary preferences to the context of intensities of
preference.
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In the context of reciprocal preference relations, the notion of transitivity is not as clear as it is in the
context of ordinary preference relations (see, for instance, [3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37]).
In our case, we make use of a monotonic operator to define the transitivity conditions for the reciprocal
preference relations. Proper definitions are stated below.
Definition 2. A function g : [0.5, 1]2 −→ [0.5, 1] is a monotonic operator if it satisfies the following
conditions:
1. Continuity.
2. Increasingness: g(a, b) ≥ g(c, d) for all a, b, c, d ∈ [0.5, 1] such that a ≥ c and b ≥ d.
3. Symmetry: g(a, b) = g(b, a) for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1].
Definition 3. Given a monotonic operator g, R ∈ R(X) is g-transitive if for all i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} the
following holds:
(rij > 0.5 and rjl > 0.5) ⇒
(
ril > 0.5 and ril ≥ g(rij , rjl)
)
.
Tg denotes the set of all g-transitive reciprocal preference relations. Notice that, given two monotonic
operators, say f and g, such that f ≤ g, i.e., f(a, b) ≤ g(a, b) for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1], if a reciprocal preference
relation R is g-transitive, then R is also f -transitive; in other words, Tg ⊆ Tf .
We only consider three monotonic operators in order to model the consistency on individual reciprocal
preference relations: the constant function 0.5, the minimum and the maximum.
1. R is 0.5-transitive if R is g-transitive, with g(a, b) = 0.5 for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1].
2. R is min-transitive if R is g-transitive, with g(a, b) = min{a, b} for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1].
3. R is max-transitive if R is g-transitive, with g(a, b) = max{a, b} for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1].
We denote with T0.5, Tmin, Tmax the sets of all 0.5-transitive, min-transitive and max-transitive reciprocal
preference relations, respectively. Obviously, Tmax ⊆ Tmin ⊆ T0.5.
2.3. Majorities based on difference in support
Majorities based on difference in support (also called M˜k majorities), aggregate individual intensities
of preference, i.e., reciprocal preference relations, into collective ordinary preferences. When we compare
two alternatives, they declare an alternative as the winner if the sum of the intensities for that alternative
exceeds the sum of the intensities for the other one in a threshold, fixed before the election process. Such
threshold varies in a continuous space given that intensities also do it. M˜k majorities were introduced and
axiomatically characterized by Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [14] and they generalize majorities based on
difference of votes (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [13] and Llamazares [22]), which ask to the winner
alternative for a positive difference of votes with respect to the other one, also fixed before the election
process. In the following definition we formally present these majorities.
5
Definition 4. Given a threshold k ∈ [0,m) and D ⊆ R(X)m, the M˜k majority is the mapping M˜k : D −→
P(X) defined by M˜k(R1, . . . , Rm) = Pk, where
xiPkxj ⇔
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m∑
p=1
rpji + k.
As we just show, M˜k majorities assign a collective ordinary preference relation to each profile of individual
reciprocal preference relations. It is easy to check (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Llamazares [14]) that Pk can
be defined through the average of the individual intensities of preference:
xiPkxj ⇔ 1
m
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m+ k
2m
,
or, equivalently,
xiPkxj ⇔
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m+ k
2
. (2)
The indifference relation associated with Pk is defined by:
xiIkxj ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
p=1
rpij −
m∑
p=1
rpji
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k,
or, equivalently,
xiIkxj ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
p=1
rpij −
m
2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k2 .
Some interesting facts could be stated about the behavior of M˜k majorities. Assume that an alternative
is preferred to another one for a given threshold. If the threshold becomes smaller, then the preference does
not change. And if such a threshold becomes greater than before, the preference holds or, at most, turns
into indifference. Due to both facts, we have that whenever an alternative is preferred to another one for
a certain threshold, such preference cannot be reverse for neither a greater, nor a smaller threshold (see
Remark 1 in Llamazares et al. [26]).
3. Triple-acyclicity when individuals are 0.5-transitive
This section includes the conditions on thresholds k for triple-acyclic collective decisions Pk when indi-
vidual reciprocal relations fulfill 0.5-transitivity. In such a case, these thresholds depend on the number of
voters involved on the election process, which is reflected in the following results.
In Theorem 1 we show that for any threshold smaller than b2m/3c we can find profiles of 0.5-transitive
reciprocal preferences for which the triple-acyclicity on collective decision fails.
Theorem 1. There does not exist k ∈ [0, b2m/3c) such that Pk is triple-acyclic for every profile of individual
preferences (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tm0.5.
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Proof. Let k ∈ [0, b2m/3c) and let RI, RII, RIII and RIV be the following reciprocal preference relations:
RI =

0.5 1 34 − k4b2m/3c . . .
0 0.5 1 . . .
1
4 +
k
4b2m/3c 0 0.5 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
II =

0.5 1 0 . . .
0 0.5 14 +
k
4b2m/3c . . .
1 34 − k4b2m/3c 0.5 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,
RIII =

0.5 14 +
k
4b2m/3c 0 . . .
3
4 − k4b2m/3c 0.5 1 . . .
1 0 0.5 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
IV =

0.5 0.5 0.5 . . .
0.5 0.5 0.5 . . .
0.5 0.5 0.5 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,
where non clearly stated elements above take the value of 0.5. It is easy to check that the previous reciprocal
relations belong to T0.5. We distinguish three cases:
1. If m = 3q, with q ∈ N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q,
RIII if i = 2q + 1, . . . , 3q.
According to equivalence (2) and given that b2m/3c = 2q, x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q
)
>
3q + k
2
.
Since
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q
)
>
3q + k
2
⇔ 18q + k > 12q + 4k ⇔ k < 2q,
2q = b2m/3c, and k < b2m/3c is satisfied by hypothesis, we get x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1, and,
consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
2. If m = 3q + 1, with q ∈ N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q,
RIII if i = 2q + 1, . . . , 3q,
RIV if i = 3q + 1.
According to equivalence (2) and given that b2m/3c = 2q, x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q
)
+ 0.5 >
3q + 1 + k
2
.
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Since
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q
)
+ 0.5 >
3q + 1 + k
2
⇔ 18q + k > 12q + 4k ⇔ k < 2q,
2q = b2m/3c, and k < b2m/3c is satisfied by hypothesis, we get x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1, and,
consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
3. If m = 3q+ 2, with q ∈ {0} ∪N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q + 1,
RII if i = q + 2, . . . , 2q + 2,
RIII if i = 2q + 3, . . . , 3q + 2.
According to equivalence (2) and given that b2m/3c = 2q + 1, x1Pkx2 will happen if
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q + 4
)
+ 2 >
3q + 2 + k
2
.
On the other hand, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q + 4
)
+ 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q + 4
>
3q + 2 + k
2
.
Since
q
(
9
4
+
k
8q + 4
)
+
5
4
+
k
8q + 4
>
3q + 2 + k
2
⇔ q
(
9 +
k
2q + 1
)
+ 5 +
k
2q + 1
> 6q + 4 + 2k
⇔ 3q + 1 > k
(
2− q + 1
2q + 1
)
⇔ 3q + 1 > k 3q + 1
2q + 1
⇔ k < 2q + 1,
2q + 1 = b2m/3c, and k < b2m/3c is satisfied by hypothesis, we have x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1. Moreover,
given that
q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q + 4
)
+ 2 > q
(
1 + 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q + 4
)
+ 1 +
1
4
+
k
8q + 4
,
we also have x1Pkx2. Therefore, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
Triple-acyclic collective decisions are guaranteed when the threshold is greater than or equal to b2m/3c.
Before establishing this result, we specify in the following lemma the minimum number of 0.5-transitive
individuals who have to prefer an alternative to another one to reach a particular collective intensity of
preference for the first alternative over the second one.
Lemma 1. Let (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tm0.5. Given a ∈ R and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if
∑m
p=1 r
p
ij > a, then there are at
least b2a−mc+ 1 individuals for which rpij > 0.5.
Proof. The following case provides the minimum number of individuals for which rpij > 0.5:
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1. If rpij > 0.5, then r
p
ij = 1.
2. If rpij ≤ 0.5, then rpij = 0.5.
Therefore, in this case, if z is the number of individuals for which rpij > 0.5, we have
m∑
p=1
rpij > a ⇔ 1z + 0.5(m− z) > a ⇔ 0.5z > a− 0.5m ⇔ z > 2a−m ⇔ z ≥ b2a−mc+ 1.
Theorem 2. If k ∈ [b2m/3c,m), then Pk is triple-acyclic for every profile of individual preferences
(R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tm0.5.
Proof. We are going to prove that if Pk is not triple-acyclic, then k < b2m/3c. Suppose there exist
(R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tm0.5 and i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xiPkxj , xjPkxl and xlPkxi. According to equiva-
lence (2) we have
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m+ k
2
,
m∑
p=1
rpjl >
m+ k
2
and
m∑
p=1
rpli >
m+ k
2
.
Then, by Lemma 1, we get
#
{
p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | rpij > 0.5
}
+ #
{
p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | rpjl > 0.5
}
+ #
{
p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | rpli > 0.5
} ≥ 3(bkc+ 1).
On the other hand, Rp ∈ T0.5 for every p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Therefore, for every p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, at most two
of the values rpij , r
p
jl and r
p
li are greater than 0.5. So,
#
{
p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | rpij > 0.5
}
+ #
{
p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | rpjl > 0.5
}
+ #
{
p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | rpli > 0.5
} ≤ 2m.
Consequently,
3
(bkc+ 1) ≤ 2m ⇔ bkc ≤ 2m
3
− 1 ⇔ k <
⌊
2m
3
⌋
.
4. Triple-acyclicity when individuals are g-transitive (g ≥ min)
Now, we explore the conditions for triple-acyclic collective decisions under majorities based on difference
in support when reciprocal preference relations are g-transitive being g a function greater than or equal to
the minimum operator.
Next lemma states that whenever an individual is endowed with the just described reciprocal preference
relations over three alternatives, say xi, xj and xl, then the sum of the intensities rij , rjl and rli reaches at
maximum the value of 2.
Lemma 2. Let g be a monotonic operator such that g ≥ min. If R ∈ Tg, then rij + rjl + rli ≤ 2 for all
i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Proof. Assume, by reduction to absurdity, that there exist i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that rij + rjl + rli > 2.
From this inequality we get that at least two of the above addends are greater than 0.5. But, since R is
g-transitive (being g a function greater than or equal to the minimum), only two of the above addends
are greater than 0.5. Assume that rij , rjl > 0.5. Then ril ≥ min{rij , rjl} or, in the same way, rli ≤
max{rji, rlj} = max{1− rij , 1− rjl}. Therefore,
rij + rjl + rli ≤ rij + rjl + max{1− rij , 1− rjl} ≤ 2,
which contradicts rij + rjl + rli > 2.
With the other two possible cases, say rij , rli > 0.5 and rjl, rli > 0.5, the contradiction is also achieved
with a similar reasoning as the one just used for the case rij , rjl > 0.5.
Now, we can establish a general result for the individual preferences that fulfil the types of transitivities
included in this section.
Theorem 3. For each monotonic operator g such that g ≥ min and each k ∈ [m/3,m), Pk is triple-acyclic
for every profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tmg .
Proof. Assume, by reduction to absurdity, that Pk is not triple-acyclic. Then, it exists a profile of preferences
(R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tmg and i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xiPkxj , xjPkxl and xlPkxi; that is,
m∑
p=1
rpij >
m+ k
2
,
m∑
p=1
rpjl >
m+ k
2
and
m∑
p=1
rpli >
m+ k
2
.
Adding member to member the three inequalities above and taking into account that k ≥ m/3, we have
m∑
p=1
rpij +
m∑
p=1
rpjl +
m∑
p=1
rpli >
3
2
(m+ k) ≥ 3
2
(
m+
m
3
)
= 2m. (3)
But, by Lemma 2, we have
m∑
p=1
rpij +
m∑
p=1
rpjl +
m∑
p=1
rpli =
m∑
p=1
(rpij + r
p
jl + r
p
li) ≤ 2m,
which contradicts inequality (3).
The previous theorem allows us to guarantee triple-acyclic collective decisions when the threshold is
greater than or equal to m/3. In what follows, the remaining values of the threshold are analyzed according
to whether the reciprocal preference relations fulfil min-transitivity or max-transitivity.
4.1. The case g = min
As we establish in the following theorem, when the threshold is smaller than m/3, we can find profiles
of min-transitive reciprocal preferences for which the triple-acyclicity on collective decision fails.
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Theorem 4. There does not exist k ∈ [0,m/3) such that Pk is triple-acyclic for every profile of individual
preferences (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tmmin.
Proof. Let k ∈ [0,m/3) and let RI, RII, RIII, RIV and RV be the following reciprocal preference relations:
RI =

0.5 1 23 · · ·
0 0.5 23 · · ·
1
3
1
3 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
II =

0.5 13 0 · · ·
2
3 0.5
2
3 · · ·
1 13 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,
RIII =

0.5 1 1 · · ·
0 0.5 1 · · ·
0 0 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
IV =

0.5 1 0 · · ·
0 0.5 0 · · ·
1 1 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
V =

0.5 0 0 · · ·
1 0.5 1 · · ·
1 0 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,
where non clearly stated elements above take the value of 0.5. It is easy to check that the previous reciprocal
relations belong to Tmin. We distinguish two cases according to whether m is even or odd.
1. If m = 2q, with q ∈ N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =
R
I if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q.
Suppose (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1)}. Note that rpij + rq+pij = 4/3 for all p ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Therefore,
m∑
p=1
rpij =
q∑
p=1
(rpij + r
q+p
ij ) =
m
2
4
3
=
2m
3
.
Now, according to equivalence (2), x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
2m
3
>
m+ k
2
⇔ k < m
3
,
which is satisfied by hypothesis. Consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
2. If m = 2q+ 3, with q ∈ {0} ∪N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q,
RIII if i = 2q + 1,
RIV if i = 2q + 2,
RV if i = 2q + 3.
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Suppose (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1)}. Note that rpij + rq+pij = 4/3 for all p ∈ {1, . . . , q} and r2q+1ij +
r2q+2ij + r
2q+3
ij = 2. Therefore,
m∑
p=1
rpij =
q∑
p=1
(rpij + r
q+p
ij ) + 2 =
m− 3
2
4
3
+ 2 =
2m
3
.
Now, according to equivalence (2), x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
2m
3
>
m+ k
2
⇔ k < m
3
,
which is satisfied by hypothesis. Consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
4.2. The case g = max
Analogously to the case g = min, our aim is to analyze what happens when the threshold is smaller than
m/3. But, in this case, we can only show that there exist profiles of max-transitive reciprocal preferences
for which the triple-acyclicity on collective decision fails when the threshold is smaller than b2m/3c/2.
Theorem 5. There does not exist k ∈ [0, b2m/3c/2) such that Pk is triple-acyclic for every profile of
individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm) ∈ Tmmax.
Proof. Let k ∈ [0, b2m/3c/2) and let RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV and RVI be the following reciprocal preference
relations:
RI =

0.5 1 1 · · ·
0 0.5 1 · · ·
0 0 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
II =

0.5 1 0 · · ·
0 0.5 0 · · ·
1 1 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
III =

0.5 0 0 · · ·
1 0.5 1 · · ·
1 0 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,
RIV =

0.5 0.5 0.5 · · ·
0.5 0.5 0.5 · · ·
0.5 0.5 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
V =

0.5 0.75 0.75 · · ·
0.25 0.5 0.75 · · ·
0.25 0.25 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, R
VI =

0.5 0.5 0 · · ·
0.5 0.5 0.5 · · ·
1 0.5 0.5 · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,
where non clearly stated elements above take the value of 0.5. It is easy to check that the previous reciprocal
relations belong to Tmax. We distinguish three cases:
1. If m = 3q, with q ∈ N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q,
RIII if i = 2q + 1, . . . , 3q.
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According to equivalence (2), x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
2q >
3q + k
2
.
Since
2q >
3q + k
2
⇔ k < q,
q = b2m/3c/2, and k < b2m/3c/2 is satisfied by hypothesis, we get x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1, and,
consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
2. If m = 3q + 1, with q ∈ N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q,
RIII if i = 2q + 1, . . . , 3q,
RIV if i = 3q + 1.
According to equivalence (2), x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
2q + 0.5 >
3q + 1 + k
2
.
Since
2q + 0.5 >
3q + 1 + k
2
⇔ k < q,
q = b2m/3c/2, and k < b2m/3c/2 is satisfied by hypothesis, we get x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1, and,
consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
3. If m = 3q+ 2, with q ∈ {0} ∪N, we consider the profile of individual preferences (R1, . . . , Rm), where
Ri =

RI if i = 1, . . . , q,
RII if i = q + 1, . . . , 2q,
RIII if i = 2q + 1, . . . , 3q,
RV if i = 3q + 1,
RVI if i = 3q + 2.
According to equivalence (2), x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1 will happen if
2q + 1.25 >
3q + 2 + k
2
.
Since
2q + 1.25 >
3q + 2 + k
2
⇔ k < q + 0.5,
q+ 0.5 = b2m/3c/2, and k < b2m/3c/2 is satisfied by hypothesis, we get x1Pkx2, x2Pkx3 and x3Pkx1,
and, consequently, Pk is not triple-acyclic.
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The results obtained in Theorems 3 and 5 do not include all possible values for the threshold k. So, we
do not know what happens when k ∈ [b2m/3c/2,m/3). In the case m = 3q, with q ∈ N, such interval is
empty whereas in the cases m = 3q+1, with q ∈ N, and m = 3q+2, with q ∈ {0}∪N, it is not. Specifically,
the problematic interval in the case m = 3q+1 is
[
m/3−1/3,m/3), and [m/3−1/6,m/3) when m = 3q+2.
Our conjecture in these intervals is that Pk is also triple-acyclic for every profile of max-transitive individual
preferences. Below, we show that it is the case when m = 2, that is, when m = 3q + 2 with q = 0.
Nevertheless, the mathematical complexity of the proof seems to predict the impossibility of getting similar
proofs for the general case m = 3q + 2 (the same comment can be made for the case m = 3q + 1).
Theorem 6. If m = 2 and k ∈ [0.5, 2), then Pk is triple-acyclic for every profile of individual preferences
(R1, R2) ∈ T 2max.
Proof. Assume, by reduction to absurdity, that Pk is not triple-acyclic. Then, there exist (R
1, R2) ∈ T 2max,
i, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xiPkxj , xjPkxl and xlPkxi. Therefore,
r1ij + r
2
ij > 1 +
k
2
≥ 1.25, r1jl + r2jl > 1 +
k
2
≥ 1.25, r1li + r2li > 1 +
k
2
≥ 1.25.
It is valuable to highlight that the last condition is equivalent to r1il + r
2
il < 0.75. Let distinguish three
cases depending on the cardinality of the following set:
P =
{
p ∈ {1, 2} | min{rpij , rpjl} > 0.5
}
.
1. If #P=2, then, by the max-transitivity condition, we have rpil ≥ max{rpij , rpjl} for all p ∈ {1, 2}.
Therefore, r1il + r
2
il ≥ r1ij + r2ij > 1.25, which contradicts r1il + r2il < 0.75.
2. If #P=1, we can assume, without loss of generality, that P = {1}. So, by the max-transitivity
condition, we get r1il ≥ max{r1ij , r1jl} > 0.5. Given that r1il + r2il < 0.75, we have r2il < 0.25 and
max{r1ij , r1jl} < 0.75− r2il. We distinguish two cases:
(a) If r2ij ≤ 0.5, then, 0.75 − r2il > r1ij > 1.25 − r2ij ; so, r2ij − r2il > 0.5, which is an absurdity given
that r2ij , r
2
il ∈ [0, 0.5].
(b) If r2ij > 0.5, then, given that P = {1}, we have that r2jl ≤ 0.5. In that case, 0.75 − r2il > r1jl >
1.25− r2jl; so, r2jl − r2il > 0.5, which is an absurdity given that r2jl, r2il ∈ [0, 0.5].
3. If #P=0, given that r1ij + r2ij > 1.25 and r1jl + r2jl > 1.25, we can assume, without lost of generality,
that r1ij > 0.5, r
1
jl ≤ 0.5, r2ij ≤ 0.5 and r2jl > 0.5. Given that r1li + r2li > 1.25, we distinguish three
cases:
(a) If r1li > 0.5 and r
2
li > 0.5, then, as R
1, R2 ∈ Tmax, we have r1lj ≥ max{r1li, r1ij} and r2ji ≥
max{r2jl, r2li}. The first condition is equivalent to r1jl ≤ min{r1ji, r1il}. Therefore,
r1ji + r
2
ji ≥ r1jl + r2jl > 1.25,
which is an absurdity because r1ij + r
2
ij > 1.25.
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(b) If r1li > 0.5 and r
2
li ≤ 0.5, then, as R1 ∈ Tmax, we have r1lj ≥ max{r1li, r1ij}, which is equivalent to
r1jl ≤ min{r1ji, r1il}. Therefore,
r2jl − r2il ≥ (r1jl + r2jl)− (r1il + r2il) > 1.25− 0.75 = 0.5,
which is an absurdity because r2jl, r
2
il ∈ [0.5, 1].
(c) If r1li ≤ 0.5, then, given that r1li + r2li > 1.25, we have r2li > 0.75. As R2 ∈ Tmax, then r2ji ≥
max{r2jl, r2li}, which is equivalent to r2ij ≤ min{r2il, r2lj}. Therefore,
r1ij − r1il ≥ (r1ij + r2ij)− (r1il + r2il) > 1.25− 0.75 = 0.5,
which is an absurdity because r1ij , r
1
il ∈ [0.5, 1].
5. Discussion
In this paper we have determined the values of the threshold k to ensure triple-acyclic collective preference
relations when we consider M˜k majorities on three types of g-transitive reciprocal preference relations. On
the one hand, for 0.5-transitive reciprocal preference relations, we have found that needed thresholds are,
at minimum, around two thirds of the voters involved in the election process. On the other hand, for min-
transitive and max-transitive reciprocal preferences relations, the needed threshold fails to around one third
of the voters. Therefore, the harder the rationality condition over individual preferences is, the smaller the
threshold required for triple-acyclic collective decisions is.
It is worth noting that a study of the consistency of the collective decisions under majorities based on
difference in support was carried out by Llamazares et al. [26]. In that work, consistency was understand
as transitivity. The main conclusions there were somewhat disappointing. On the one hand, for any
k ∈ [0,m − 1) and any monotonic operator g, we can find profiles of g-transitive reciprocal preferences for
which the collective preference decision is not transitive. The same result is obtained when k ∈ [m− 1,m)
and g(a, b) < (a+ b)/2 for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1], a 6= b. On the other hand, for g-transitive reciprocal preferences,
with g(a, b) ≥ (a + b)/2 for all a, b ∈ [0.5, 1], transitive collective preferences can be ensured for thresholds
located in [m − 1,m). Therefore, it is required almost unanimity in individual preferences for arriving to
a transitive collective decision and only when individual preference relations fulfill g-transitivity, being g
greater than or equal to the arithmetic mean operator.
We summarize these results in Table 1, where we show the individual rationality conditions considered
in the analysis of triple-acyclicity; that is, 0.5-transitivity, min-transitivity and max-transitivity.
Notice that the conditions for consistent collective decisions are setting on the thresholds of support and
the requirements on them depend on how rational individuals are; i.e., on the transitivity condition that
fulfil the individual preferences. So, the more rational the individuals are, the less the needed support for
15
Table 1: Values of k for collective transitivity and triple-acyclicity.
Individual g-transitivity Transitivity Triple-acyclicity
g = 0.5 ∅
[b2m/3c,m)
g = min ∅ [m/3,m)
g = max [m− 1,m) [m/3,m)
getting consistent collective decisions is. In other words, the stronger the transitivity condition on individual
preferences is, the easier to reach consistent collective decisions is. Moreover, the required thresholds look
more feasible in the case of triple-acyclicity than in the case of transitivity, given that no so extreme support
is required. That is coherent with the fact that triple-acyclicity is a weaker rationality condition than
transitivity.
The aggregation of individual reciprocal preferences under majorities based on difference in support
can be understood as the aggregation of such individual preference relations through the arithmetic mean
operator. Under such view, the preference Pk is reached by means of an α-cut
2; i.e., an alternative is
preferred to another one if the arithmetic mean of the intensities of preferences for that alternative over the
other one exceeds the value of α. To rewrite Pk by means of an α-cut, let R : X×X −→ [0, 1] the reciprocal
preference relation defined by the arithmetic mean of the individual intensities of preference, i.e.,
R(xi, xj) =
1
m
m∑
p=1
rpij .
Then, Pk = Rα, with α = (m+ k)/2m.
It is worth noting that the arithmetic mean operator has been widely used in the literature for aggregating
individual intensities of preference into collective intensities of preference. But, as it has been pointed out
by some authors, the choice of an alternative has to be unambiguous. Quoting Barrett et al. [1]: In real
life, people often have vague preferences. . . However, when confronted with an actual choice situation, where
an alternative has to be chosen from a given feasible set of alternatives, the decision maker must make an
unambiguous choice, even when his preferences are fuzzy; there cannot be any vagueness about the actual
act of choice itself.
In this sense, α-cuts are a valuable tool for obtaining unambiguous choices from collective intensities of
preference. The results given in this paper, together with those given by Llamazares et al. [26], allow us to
know the values of α for which the collective decision is transitive or triple-acyclic. These values, calculated
by applying the relation between α and k to the values in Table 1, are shown in Table 2.
2If R ∈ R(X) and α ∈ [0.5, 1), the α-cut of R is the ordinary preference relation Rα defined by xiRαxj ⇔ R(xi, xj) > α.
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Table 2: Values of α for collective transitivity and triple-acyclicity.
Individual g-transitivity Transitivity Triple-acyclicity
g = 0.5 ∅
[5/6, 1), when m = 3q
[5/6− 1/3m, 1), when m = 3q + 1
[5/6− 1/6m, 1), when m = 3q + 2
g = min ∅ [2/3, 1)
g = max [1− 1/2m, 1) [2/3, 1)
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